Abstract
Introduction
The United States relies on the Air Force and the Air Force has never been the decisive factor in the history of wars.
-Saddam Hussein (1990) 1 Major General Salah Aboud Mahmaud, the Iraqi III Corps commander, sat in his helicopter and watched two American F-111 fighter aircraft destroy the building where he was going to have his commander's conference. He leaned over to his executive officer and told him he hoped this was not a bad omen for the upcoming offensive. The battle of Khafji did validate the idea that airpower could be used to defeat the enemy army before it closed with our own ground forces, that it could feed the battle indigestible chunks for our own friendly ground forces. Khafji validated what a lot of airman had been saying for a long time. 3 In fact, the lessons learned from Khafji may not have been any different from previous wars. Close Air Support (CAS) and Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) are suitable when enemy forces are moving and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) is extremely important to prosecute the attack. One of the differences in the Gulf War may have been new technology. Stealth, precision guided munitions, and information superiority increased the capabilities and firepower of our force structure. The new twist which technology brought to the war was "airpower can effectively attack these moving ground forces even when they (the enemy ground forces) imagine they are concealed by darkness." 4 It enabled the war to be fought effectively for 24 hours each day. But Khafji may not have been the culminating point in proving airpower.
Was the "Battle of Khafji" really the crowning glory of the Air Force and the validation they have proclaimed for so many years? Or was it just an evolution of airpower through technological improvements and the proper application? What was the Air power has become predominant, both as a deterrent to war, and -in the eventuality of war -as the devastating force to destroy an enemy's potential and fatally undermine his will to wage war. 5 Or was success caused by the combined efforts of the Marine ground forces, Marine aviation in direct support of the battle and the interdiction efforts of the Air Force?
The Air Force may never know all the answers, but before it develops new doctrine and changes concepts for future conflicts, it must consider the entire story.
Whatever the Air Force decides, it will have a profound effect on the way the Air Force organizes, trains and equips the force of the future. A careful re-examination of the Battle of Khafji looking at the Iraqi intent, C4ISR, BDA, and our emerging doctrine would thus seem to be in order. The report will not be a repeat of the battle but an analysis of these areas of interest.
Notes
1 Richard P. Hallion, Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, p. 162. 2 Robert H. Scales, Jr., Brigadier General, Certain Victory. Washington D.C.: Officer of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1993, pp. . I have drawn a little into the story to help build on this paper. The United States knows that General Mahmaud was not in the building but they do not know if he was in the helicopter. An alert analyst had intercepted a transmission that mentioned a commander's conference to be held in the Iraqi III Corps sector two day prior to the Battle of Khafji. This information was transmitted to Riyadh where two F-111 fighters suitably armed were diverted to the target area. They did release weapons on the building in question. The next day, overhead imagery confirmed the building was hit and showed an Iraqi helicopter nearby. I have taken literary license concerning this incident about General Mahmaud being there and watching the attack. The impact of airpower in the Battle of Khafji was a decisive element in the battle, particularly when you consider that artillery and naval gunfire were out of position to support the screening forces along the border. But it was not the singularly decisive element. Dr Rebecca Grant says, "Dominance in the air can strip the initiative from an enemy force and do it with the efficiency that makes airpower the decisive weight in the operational balance." 6 Airpower at Khafji did not strip the initiative from the enemy; it reacted slowly, yet succeeded due to our dominance in the air. Our shortcomings were evident in post action analysis of the Iraqi intent, C4ISR, and Battlefield Damage
Analysis
Assessment. This battle serves to illuminate the importance of combined arms, rather than validate airpower as a conclusive force able to halt a determined enemy armored offensive. If the results are slightly tainted, the Air Force may need to revisit its emerging doctrine concerning the halt phase. These are areas the Air Force needs to study as they prepare for the next war.
Iraqi Intent
The future of battle on the ground will be preceded by battle in the air. This will determine which of the contestants has to suffer operational and tactical disadvantages and be forced throughout the battle into adopting compromise solutions. were unaware of the western movement of Army forces, then they would be attacking into the teeth of the coalition defensive positions. However, a short reconnaissance in force conducted to a limited depth could achieve both the requirements for prisoners and intelligence.
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel
Although three separate divisions were identified as participating in the attack, only four battalion size elements were ever determined to be actively involved with the cross-border attack.
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The EPW reports were substantiated by the tactical actions of the attacking forces.
Two of the Iraqi battalions were stopped before they could cross the border in force.
However, a mechanized battalion augmented with tanks drove unmolested into Khafji and stopped in the center of the town. 13 Why was there no attempt to continue the attack further south? Why did some of these forces then begin withdrawing back to the north? Churchill once said, "The Americans will do the right thing, but only after they have exhausted all the alternatives". The coalition eventually prevailed at Khafji.
Unfortunately, as General Buster Glosson later recalled, "Khafji would be remembered as a day that the Air Force would like to forget, because the JSTARS clearly showed advancement of armor moving South,"
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The coalition had established priorities for intelligence information gathering.
The precedence was to find the location of SCUDS, monitor the Republican Guard (RGFC) and assess BDA. As the Khafji battle began, there was a major SCUD search being conducted that drew on extensive collection assets. The RGFC locations had been located earlier but as luck would have it, several RGFC units had moved and their location was unknown. The location of the RGFC created considerable concern and seemingly lent credibility to the estimate of the Khafji action as diversionary. 23 The focused effort of intelligence, combined with the political sensitivity of eliminating the SCUD threat and protecting the repositioning of ARCENT, resulted in ignoring the extensive movement of Iraqi forces within the Southern KTO.
Reconnaissance teams positioned along the border had identified, reported and engaged Iraqi forces throughout the week prior to Khafji. 24 The CIA had provided advance warning of a likely offensive by Iraqi forces to Central Command's operation centers a week prior to the battle. Pilots had made numerous reports of concentration of enemy forces within the southern KTO. The Army remained concerned that Iraqi forces would attempt a spoiling attack on their forces moving to the west and also demanded surveillance assets. There never was a reasonable degree of near real-time knowledge of the enemy and friendly actions.
"War is the realm of uncertainty, three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lessor uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth." 26 The
Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action Loop (OODA Loop) was laboriously slow. Several factors are attributed to this. First, coalition forces were lulled into a false sense of security. Reports of Iraqi surrenders, inactivity of enemy and high battle damage assessments dominated the thinking countering the skilled intelligence required to scent out the truth. Secondly, the air campaign was an enormous undertaking. The production of the ATO took 72 hours and it was difficult to disseminate. The commander's intent for use of airpower was clearly oriented on destruction of strategic targets and left little room for deviation. Only after General Horner was made aware of the actions on the border, 4 hours after the engagement at OP-4, did the TACC begin to re-direct some of their efforts. Thirdly, coalition forces attempted to minimize casualties at this early stage.
They avoided positioning of artillery and NGSF into higher threat locations, which either put them out of effective range or reduced their reaction time.
To compound the slow response to the enemy initiative, communications requirements could not match demands. MARCENT imagery support was limited by the capacity of the Navy's Fleet Imagery Terminal's low capacity of the UHF SATCOM channels. Limitations of Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pods (TARPS) on Navy aircraft due to the high altitude profiles, combined with the film based system made the response slow and inadequate. Much of the JFACC coordination with land based wings was via telephone but limited to a single radio circuit between the JFACC and the Navy battle forces. At the tactical level, communication between the Airborne Control Element (ACE) aboard the AWACS, the JSTARS, the EC-130 ABCCC and the DASC was corrupted by incompatible or unreliable systems. 27 In many cases, aircraft flew in kill boxes or waited at contact points due to poor communications or clogged nets.
Numerous sorties went unused. For example, the first JFACC diverted aircraft on scene to support operations at OP-4 were not used. The F-15Es could not contact the ABCCC, and the A-10s were unable to establish a link between the DASC and the ground forward air controller. 28 Airspace coordination became hazardous without effective coordination between the responsible agencies. Ground forward air controllers were experiencing jamming, resulting in losing valuable air assets. Communications were strained, with the UHF SATCOM net saturated, creating mutual interference. MARCENT air request nets relied on HF, which was hampered by climatic conditions, yielding poor propagation. In summary, C4ISR as a battlefield operating system was inefficient during the battle of Khafji. Intelligence as it synthesized information was deprived of accurate battle damage assessment, a persistent surveillance capability, and adequate reconnaissance collection resources. The rapid pace of the air campaign, coupled with the ability of new sensors, such as JSTARS, outran the procedures which theater-wide air constructed tasking. Decision-makers at various levels of the Tactical Air Control System often did not get the information they needed. 30 Airpower was undoubtedly the essential element in disrupting the enemy offensive, but conditions were not in place to optimize our combat power. After review of total JFACC diverted sorties and the actual strikes that were successfully executed, the impact upon the enemy was far less that it could have been. When the war started, the Coalition was ready for almost everything but how to assess battle damage. "With these burdens to be borne, there was little room for a beginning-to-end joint BDA architecture. Few prewar BDA and intelligence-collection exercises were held, since the focus was on warning and deployment, not on strike planning. As a result, an ad hoc joint BDA architecture had to be built largely from scratch during the conflict. Planners also used unofficial sources of information to get their BDA and measure attrition levels on the battlefield. 34 This led to problems in assessing how effective airpower was in inflicting damage to the Iraqis. At least three post war assessments of BDA were done; one by the Gulf War Air Power Survey, another by Marine Mission Reports (MISREPS), and also a ground survey by a civilian group led by Mr. John
Talbot. As these three reports indicate there is a clear discrepancy. Just comparing tanks, the GWAPS claimed 554 tanks were destroyed from the air during the battle of Khafji.
The Marines claim air assets during the entire war killed 165 tanks. Mr. Talbot's joint assessment team could only find 163 tanks killed in the entire KTO and only 28 of these were due to air power (both air force and helicopters). An even bigger surprise is the large number (235) of fully operational tanks that were taken for future use by the Syrians, Egyptians, U.S., and other coalition forces. Both the GWAPS and Marine data reliability are questionable because of the collection methods and data sources. Mr.
Talbot study, although surprising low, appears to have conducted the most thorough analysis. His team conducted both ground and air reconnaissance of the entire KTO (Note: their study did not include forces destroyed in Iraq where the major land battles occurred with the Republican Guard and U.S. Army forces.) Using atomic coding for a relatively high degree of accuracy, the team was able to determine the types of weapons that actually hit/destroyed the tanks. Although, there was some discrepancies involving kills due to A10 and ground 30mm Vs 25mm rounds it appears that the numbers are the most accurate available at this time. Mr. Talbot's numbers are also supported by some classified battle damage assessments. Analysis of all these reports confirms BDA was a serious problem and led planners to believe the damage they were inflicting was greater than reality.
The primary reason for the scantiness of information was the lack of an integrated BDA concept of operation. This was caused by not fully integrating the BDA process with the attack planning process. General Schwarzkopf further complicated the issue by making ARCENT and MARCENT responsible for assessing the damage to the Iraqis in their sector because of his 50% rule. 35 The Army, Marines, and Air Force did not have a clear idea on how to assess BDA. Because of this, the percentage number of kills was never the same. This led to a misinterpretation of the Iraqi's true strength. 36 A second factor was the difference between functional and physical damage. The ability to collect functional damage was non-existent during the war and is an area the military needs to further study. A bomb might hit a building or bunker, but to the analyst, the damage assessed might be minimal. If the building remained standing, it was difficult for the photo interpreter to determine what damage had been done internally to the building. The building might not even be the target, but specific individuals that were in the building during the attack. The process took time and did not meet the demands of the Air Tasking Order (ATO). 37 Thirdly, dissemination of tactical imagery was poor at best. Wing planners were dependent on the videotapes from the aircraft cockpits to assess battle damage to plan restrikes. Adding to the confusion, ARCENT only used video imagery from four aircraft for attrition estimates: the A-10, F-111, F-15E, and AV-8. 38 There was constant disagreement concerning how many tanks were truly destroyed. Even today, the United
States is not certain how many vehicles were destroyed during the war. What is more important and needs to be evaluated more closely is the psychological damage done by airpower. "From the perspective of the Iraqi troops in the KTO, the 'air campaign's' psychological damage exceeded [its] physical damage:
1. It was ubiquitous -there were always aircraft overhead; 2. It was intense -bombing went on around the clock, day in and day out; 3. It was accurate; and Again, care must be taken when depending strictly on psychological effects. It is enemy dependent. If an enemy's will is strong, as history has shown, massive firepower is not sufficient to prevent them from continuing the operation. What is needed is a battle assessment indicator vice just battle damage assessment that considers all the factors of airpower effects.
In summary, the issues concerning BDA are summarized very well by the RAND study done by James A. Winnefeld:
1. Knowledge about information-related capabilities and how best to exploit them (i.e., theater commanders understanding the capabilities and limitations of sensors and platforms). 2. Understanding of the processes, procedures, and time involved in the collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of BDA information. 3. Commonly agreed upon and standardized rules for conducting BDA among the theater commands, services, and intelligence agencies. 4. Timely, tactical post-strike target intelligence other than that transmitted by USAF RF-4Cs, Navy F-14s, VTRs on various tactical aircraft, and Army, Navy, and Marine Corps UAVs. The lack of timely post-strike target intelligence continues to be a problem throughout the war and led to a reliance on fighter-mounted VTRs for timely post-strike tactical BDA. 
Winston Churchill
In the 1980's, the Army developed the doctrine AirLand Battle for Europe. The premise of their doctrine was to extend the battlefield emphasizing the deeper physical dimension of the modern battlefield along with the time and air-land dimension. 43 The key to AirLand Battle was offensive air support, in particular, the interdiction aspect.
"Battlefield air interdiction would enable the corps commander to engage the second echelon with air sorties before those forces became a first echelon problem." 44 
Close Air Support
We have the enemy surrounded. We are dug in and have overwhelming numbers. But enemy air power is mauling us badly. We will have to withdraw.
Japanese infantry commander, situation report to Headquarters, Burma --WWII 
Interdiction

To have command of the air means to be able to cut an enemy's army . . . off from their bases of operation and nullify their chance of winning the war.
General Guilio Douhet
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The concept of interdiction is to attack the enemy forces as far away from the friendly forces so as to prevent them from getting to the front -to destroy, divert, disrupt and delay. This means "to destroy the enemy forces and their support before they can be used . . . limit the military potential of engaged enemy . . . control the time of engagement that is most advantages to friendly forces." 49 Airpower enthusiasts argue this was not only the most significant contribution to the battle but the decisive element during the battle of Khafji.
Airpower enthusiasts believe that as the decisive element, airpower was able to keep the Iraqi reserves from arriving at Khafji. There are several examples of this. The first is when airpower attacked an extremely large convoy north of Khafji. It never reached the town. Another example is the Saudi battalion counterattack into the town.
Although not always happy with the responsiveness of airpower, General Khaled bin Sultan, the Saudi counter-part to General Schwarzkopf, was pleased with the use of airpower once it arrived. As he said in his book, "This time Coalition aircraft were ready for them and inflicted heavy damage, forcing the rest of the column to beat a hasty retreat." 50 As a result, the Iraqis never reached the town.
When the large-scale attack never occurred, General Schwarzkopf stated, "I'm really not quite sure what the Iraqis intended," and was perplexed. 51 The Air Force states the reason it never occurred was because airpower destroyed the forces in the main assembling area. The enemy was destroyed, diverted, disrupted, or delayed before it became a factor to the friendly forces all along the front lines.
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Because of the intelligence gathering assets and command and control, interdiction during this battle was extremely significant. But if the Iraqi's plan was not an offensive but a defensive strategy, then the Air Force's interpretation of the battle needs to be revisited. The impact may not have been as quantifiable in terms of changing our doctrine to 'halt phase' and stating airpower can single-handedly stop a maneuver force.
Emerging Air Force Doctrine
The point of the 'decisive halt' is to force the enemy beyond their culminating point through the early and sustained overwhelming application of air and space power. although air was supplied across the front, the only place the Iraqis were able to penetrate was in those areas undefended by ground forces.
But no one is disputing the effectiveness and significance airpower had during the battle. The Air Force arrogance of "we can do it alone" is not necessary. As stated in a brief during the "Evolution of Tactical Airpower" elective at Air War College, January 1998, "we (the Air Force) pick a side rather than maximize the potential of airpower across the spectrum." 59 The Air Force has a biased view of airpower and is leaning again towards strategic attack versus tactical (AirLand Battle); the bomber versus the attack.
The Air Force needs to be wary of the 'bomber will always get through' mentality they had in WWII. Technology will catch up and the stealth will not be invisible. The United
States does not want to find itself in the same position it found itself before Korea and 
Conclusions
The next war is certain to be one of maneuver and movement . . .. The nation that does not command the air will face deadly odds.
-General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur The more important lesson to be learned from this battle is the lack of a viable system that can conduct timely battle damage assessment or better yet, a battle assessment indicator. This system must also account for the denial and deceptions operations by enemy forces. This system will be necessary if the 'halt phase' style operation is every to come to fruition.
Each of these areas is important and significant to the results and analysis of the Air interdiction and ground maneuver must be synchronized so that each complements and reinforces the other. Synchronization is important because it can create a dilemma for the enemy that has no satisfactory answer. His dilemma is this: if he attempts to counter ground maneuver by moving rapidly, he exposes himself to unacceptable losses from air interdiction; yet if he employs measures that are effective at reducing losses caused by air interdiction, he then cannot maneuver fast enough to counter the ground component of the campaign. enemy. Not using it may be just as effective as losing it. And our military can prevent him form using his forces in an effective manner. The part of the military that prevents the enemy from using its forces may be the Air Force or it may be the Army. More than likely it will be a joint use of force that determines the outcome of the battle. The "halt phase" might be better interpreted as Joint Doctrine.
There are numerous lessons to be learned from Khafji besides the contributions of airpower. After looking specifically at airpower and Khafji, Wilfred L. Goodson speaks directly at areas the Air Force needs to consider. "Some of the areas where our modeling of air combat greatly needs improvement:
1. Command creativity -too often neglected. 2. Lethality -too often overestimated. 3. Employment strategy options -too often ignored. 4 This speaks directly to C4ISR, BDA and Doctrine. The Air Force has neglected their command and control, overestimated their lethality and failed to have a cohesive doctrine.
The future of the Air Force is dependent on studying the past in order to prepare and respond for the future.
The future is important and the strategic implications of Khafji are critical in preparing for it. Looking at this battle, the Air Force must see what it did for the overall campaign in supporting the CINC's objectives. Yes, airpower played a very large role and was extremely effective. It was critical to the success of the battle. It was also very significant. But it also was only a part of an overall victory that included other elements of the military that contributed a significant and critical part of the puzzle. Without the other forces throughout the battle, the outcome could have been significantly different. It might even be argued that without the Marines at the outposts, the Iraqi ground forces could have driven much further into the Saudi homeland and caused a strategic impasse.
The correct lessons learned from the battle must be pulled from utilizing all the data from every organization and must be drawn without a bias towards one service or another.
Parochialism must not be a part of any future study. Each service played a significant role. 
